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'ii!lf;rnlillii:JU!~il1!i1!d!;!l Late for a meeting,
your mind is working overtime on how to
adjust your presentation. Suddenly, there's a
clearing ahead. You hit the gas-and fly right
into a speed trap. Blue lights flash in your
rearview rmrror,
On the side of the road the police officer
takes your license and registration, returns to
his car, and feeds them through an optical
scanner. While you sit fuming, your name is
being checked at a remote government com-
puter center that keeps track of the websites
you visit, the books you buy online, your long-
distance phone bills, and hundreds of other
pieces of both public and private information.
Something in your past suggests behavior that
authorities deem suspicious: Perhaps your
name was included on a suspicious activity
report for using binoculars and taking pictures
"with no apparent esthetic value" in Los
Angeles, as police policy there now dictates.
As you wait, two more squad cars appear,
their lights flashing, and the officer-now
sounding a little nervous-says, "Please step
slowly out of your car and spread your arms."
It may sound like a futuristic dystopian
nightmare, but the possibility of this kind of
scenario is closer to reality than many people
imagine. Government run or sponsored data
clearing houses are now active in nearly evety
state. Known as fusion centers, they are funded
by the federal government as part of the
national response to the 9-11 terrorist attacks.
Originally envisioned as a means of sharing
anti-terrorism intelligence among federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies,
fusion centers are generally unknown to the
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public. Even legal scholars are unsure how they
fit within the country's legal framework. And
no one seems to be quite sure what they do.
"There is this concept that computers can
create a personal profile of individuals that will
predict if they are a potential security risk, but
the reliability of these models is unknown,"
says Professor of Law Danielle Citron of the
methods employed by fusion centers to sift
through vast quantities of seemingly innocuous
-but often private-data to try to identify
potential terrorists. "We are talking about it
but it is not yet in the public eye." In order to
advance the discussion and further explore
legal issues surrounding government collection
and analysis of information about private
citizens, Citron helped organize one of the
nation's first gatherings of legal scholars and
privacy experts focusing on fusion centers. The
Technology and Privacy Roundtable, which
was hosted by the School of Law during the
spring 2009 semester, brought together two
dozen experts from across the country for a
day of discussion and debate.
From the start it became apparent that it
is what is not known about fusion centers that
raises the greatest legal and privacy concerns.
"People say, 'Oh, you worry too much.' I think
now is the time to be considering these issues,"
said Roundtable co-leader Frank Pasquale, a
visiting professor of law at Yale, and the Loftus
Professor of Law at Seton Hall University, at
the session opening.
But identifying the issues means knowing
what, exactly, fusion centers are doing. Beyond
bland generalities, most centers refuse to say.
And the task is made all the more difficult by
the fact that no two fusion centers are quite
alike. The Department of Homeland Security
reports that as of February 2009 there were 58
fusion centers around the country. To date, the
Department has provided more than $380
million to state and local governments to build
and equip the centers, but does not directly
operate or control them. For the most part,
fusion centers evolved locally on an ad hoc
basis beginning around 2003. Each fusion
center is run by a unique set of state and
regional partners and, beyond having a general
mandate of information and intelligence
sharing, they often have widely differing
approaches to what information they collect,
and with whom and for what reasons they
share it.
Fusion centers use powerful computers and
sophisticated programming techniques to
scan huge quantities of data, looking for
anomalies that may indicate terrorist threats.
But in addition to public records such as
court appearances and tax records, the centers
can "fuse" private information such as phone
bills and credit reports and even secret infor-
mation provided by other government agen-
cies. This is what happened when Baltimore
peace activists and antiwar demonstrators
found themselves on federal terrorist watch
lists after the Maryland State Police infiltrated
their organizations and compiled extensive
dossiers on the protesters in 2005 and 2006.
The Baltimore Sun reported in 2008 that the
undercover state police reports failed to iden-
tifYany criminal or even potentially criminal
acts on the part of the protesters, yet nonethe-
less entered their names on a database of
potential terrorists or drug traffickers. "If you
get put on a watch list, that means airlines can
deny your ability to fly. You can potentially
lose your employment if you are deemed a
security risk, or perhaps be unable to get a
job, depending on who gets to see these lists,"
notes Citron. "You're talking about real
concrete harm."
Both the theory and technologies that
undergird the fusion systems are new-and,
say many experts, unproven-and little legal
framework exists to regulate or direct the
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centers' activities. The possible misuse of such
extensive new information collection and
analysis capabilities first drew attention in
December 2007, when the American Civil
Liberties Union published a white paper tided
"What's Wrong with Fusion Centers?" The
report identified several areas of general
concern, citing ambiguous lines of authority;
participation by both private sector subcon-
tractors and military personnel; the likelihood
of "data mining" in which centers go looking
for suspicious individuals without probable
cause; and the aura of excessive secrecy that
surrounds the centers. It went on to suggest a
number oflegal and political safeguards that
could prevent misuse of the centers' unprece-
dented information gathering ability, dryly
observing that the best solution might be to
abandon the concept entirely, and "return to
traditional law enforcement techniques based
upon reasonable suspicion that have kept
America safe and free for over 230 years."
Many observers-including report co-
author and ACLU policy counsel Michael
German-believe there is no turning back.
"The horse is out of the barn," he said at the
Roundtable. "Fusion centers are not going
away. So what do they do? Are they being
used to collect information on lawful dis-
sent? Are these places where information
on innocent activity is collected and shared?
We are very concerned that because there are
ambiguous lines of authority there is no
policing mechanism in place to prevent abuse."
Throughout the day's discussion, partici-
pants repeatedly expressed frustration at how
litrle public information is available about
fusion centers, even after six years. There was
a sense among the legal scholars and privacy
experts that they were steering without a com-
pass into uncharted territory. Consequendy,
the Roundtable at times seemed not so much
policy debate as reconnaissance mission, with
everyone putting their heads together trying to
understand what's out there. It seemed a fitting
venture for Danielle Citron, a self-described
"cyber law geek" who has gained a national
following writing about automated systems
like e-voting machines, cyber security, and
cyber harassment in scholarly journals and
the online forum Concurring Opinions
[see essay on p. 32]. The Roundtable, she
says, was the natural extension of her interests:
"All of my work is part of a broader story
about how information about us can be used
and misused." She considers a moment and
adds, "I'm a privacy person, obviously."
Citron says her involvement in the cutting-
edge field of cyber privacy rights "was pretty
serendipitous," evolving from her first law
article, published in 2006 in the UC Davis
Law Review, concerning the relatively new
technology of Voice Over Internet Protocol
and its likely effect on personal jurisdiction
theory. That investigation led her to contem-
plate the legal ramifications of other novel
electronic technologies. The following year
the Southern California Law Review published
her article "Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolu-
tion of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of
the Information Age," in which Citron drew
an intriguing legal analogy between the collec-
tion of personal information in large unregu-
lated databases and the early industrial age
creations of large reservoirs of water to power
mills. The water was harmless in repose but
could wreak havoc if the dams gave way-
though it took many years and several
tragedies before the law evolved to protect
those downstream. By the same token, in the
cyber world anyone of us could be living
downstream of a data dam without under-
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standing the risk. "The reservoir metaphor
suggests we underestimate the dangers in-
herent in damming up and collecting data,"
Citron says, reflecting her article's central
premise that new economic eras bring about
new concepts of personal harm.
If large uncontrolled databases pose risks-
as recurring stories of identity theft and wide
scale security breaches would seem to indi-
cate-then the danger becomes even more
acute, says Citron, when the scope of infor-
mation collected is hidden behind veils of
national security. "What we are seeing with
fusion centers is mission creep. They started
out as anti-terrorism tools, but now we are
seeing their mission changed to the protection
of all infrastructure from all risk. The danger
is that they are combining unproved theories
of data mining with use of private databases
that mayor may not be accurate. If the
data used is incorrect then the results are going
to reflect that. It's the old story of garbage in,
garbage out."
But the centers are not without their
defenders. According to Sean Kates '07, a law
and policy analyst in the Law School's Center
for Health and Homeland Security, first
responders such as police, fire fighters, and
other emergency personnel are especially
likely to see benefits in the centers. "What
falls apart first in a large scale emergency is
communications," he says. "First responders
look upon fusion centers as a positive because
they provide a reliable central source of good
information. "I have had police officers verify
to me that fusion centers have been helpful to
them in looking across county lines, and across
differing criminal records systems, to aid in
investigations. From that perspective it's a
good concept," says Kates.
Homeland Security's Robert Riegle, who
directs the state and local program office of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, pointed
to two recent success stories involving law
enforcement, in testimony last April before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Home-
land Security. In one, a DHS operational
specialist coordinated with federal officials on
an Amber Alert for a 3-year-old girl being
taken out of the country by a suspect wanted
for rape and murder. Using information and
contacts gathered through a California fusion
center, he was able to track the youngster to a
flight bound for the Netherlands; she was
ultimately recovered unharmed. In the second
case, the Denver fire and police departments
worked with a Colorado fusion center to track
and apprehend a suspect wanted for seven
different fire-bombings of SUVs.
Skeptics note, however, that a good concept
does not always translate into good practice.
In order to truly understand the dangers posed
by fusion centers that operate with virtually no
public awareness or oversight, we must first
invent new ways of describing our rights, says
Professor of Law and Government Mark
Graber. "The great danger is that very often we
think of constitutional rights purely in tradi-
tional paradigms that don't reflect current
reality. For example, we think that freedom of
speech means an individual can stand on the
corner and denounce the government without
fear of interference. But today ftee speech
often involves someone on the Internet. How
do we ensure free speech is not inhibited in
this environment?" Fusion centers, he says,
pose a special challenge in this new world. "In
the old days the concept of privacy meant that
there was information that the government
couldn't learn about you without going to
court to obtain a warrant. And then they had
to go look. In the past if a government official
asked me, 'What have you been reading?' I
would say, 'None of your business.' Now they
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don't need to go look, they already have the
information. From the patterns on Amazon
they know your reading habits. So it becomes
crucial that they can't use that information."
But that may require entirely different
legislation than the current regulatory struc-
ture concerning individual privacy and
electronic data. Congress passed the Privacy
Act of 1974 after numerous hearings and a
number of reports on such topics as national
data banks, commercial credit bureaus, and
the effect of computers on personal privacy. In
many ways it is a bill very much of its time,
reflecting an era before the Internet, when only
the government could have the kind of massive
concentration of computers needed to keep
and search enormous databases of private
information. When signed into law, the bill
established a code of fair information practices
governing the collection, use, and dissemina-
tion of personal information maintained in
systems by federal agencies. Information about
an individual could not be disclosed from
these systems without that person's written
consent, or by specific statutory exception; and
individuals were enabled to access and amend
their records in the case of faulty information.
In theory, at least, the Privacy Act protects
citizens from an intrusive, all-seeing govern-
ment sticking its proverbial nose in people's
private business. But what the Act does not
do--and the reason it offers little in the way of
protection today-is in any way regulate or
control private interests from intrusively
collecting, analyzing, and selling data about
individuals.
Since most fusion centers involve at least
some participation from commercial data
brokers, there is, practically speaking, no limit
and no quality control on the kinds of infor-
mation that might be sifted in search of
unusual patterns that indicate a threat. An
individual whose purchases, opinions, Internet
use, political donations, or general activities are
deemed potentially subversive-by whom or
by what standards to be determined by fusion
center operators and not shared publicly-
could be flagged for questioning, monitoring,
or observation. Since private databases are
often error-prone and not subject to consumer
control or review, Citron's "garbage in/garbage
out" dictum means the system would generate
a relatively high number of "false positives"-
flagging innocent individuals for further
scrutiny or surveillance based on faulty infor-
mation. The ACLU report points out that
even if fusion centers obtain the unrealistically
high accuracy rate of99 percent, in the U.S.
population of 300 million citizens with a
hypothetical 1,000 terrorists at large, 990
of the terrorists will be "caught" -as will 3
million innocent Americans. "We have decided
we want to live with more false positives than
negatives," says Citron. "This approach relies
on crude algorithms which mean that, for a
large number of people, you're going to be
pulled aside."
If, as most Roundtable panelists agreed,
"the horse is out of the barn" for fusion
centers, then the need for effective legal over-
sight and vigilant public scrutiny is com-
pelling. The Roman poet Juvenal once asked,
"Who will guard the guardians?" Ultimately,
the experts concluded, there will need to
be some kind of online presence "watching
the watchers."
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